Fossil Fuels Have Been “About to Disappear” For Decades
Author
Alexander M. Economides
Purpose
This article was written independently by Alexander M. Economides and originally published on LinkedIn. It was developed to examine the recurring history of fossil-fuel decline forecasts, explore why many have failed to materialize, and discuss the implications those forecasting errors have for energy policy, investment decisions, and emissions-reduction strategies.
Original Article
As far back as I can remember, people have been predicting the decline of fossil fuels.
When I first started following energy markets more than two decades ago, the discussion was already old. Some forecasts warned that the world was approaching an era of oil scarcity and economic disruption. Others argued that environmental concerns, policy changes, or technological progress would rapidly reduce demand in large consuming economies such as the United States. The specific reasons depended on the “expert,” but the conclusions remained consistent: fossil fuels were approaching a sustained decline; fossil fuels were going away.
These predictions kept failing. Global fossil fuel consumption did not enter the sustained decline these analysts anticipated. Instead, it continued to grow. Yet rather than reconsidering their underlying assumptions, their narrative often changed. Resource depletion gave way to peak oil. Peak oil gave way to demand destruction. Demand destruction gave way to renewable displacement. Then came electrification and electric vehicles. Different theories, always the same conclusion.
And when their conclusions failed to materialize, they moved the goalposts. Decline became slower growth. Replacement became partial substitution. Global consumption became selected regional examples. A prediction of falling fossil fuel use quietly became an argument that fossil fuels were growing less quickly than they otherwise might have. But slower growth is not the same thing as a decline, not even close.
One reason these forecasts repeatedly fall short is that they underestimate the scale of global demand growth. As countries industrialize and incomes rise, newly richer families want things like reliable electricity, refrigeration, transportation, heating, cooling, communications, and access to new products. This is not a temporary phenomenon; it is the natural consequence of growth and development.
Many forecasts also focus too heavily on domestic trends while overlooking the global system. Wealthy countries often celebrate the impact of reductions in local industrial activity while continuing to consume the products those industries created. The old local factories simply moved elsewhere, along with their emissions and energy requirements; their citizens did not stop using steel, cement, chemicals, plastics, electronics, or consumer goods.
Ironically, many of the same people who predict rapid fossil fuel decline also argue that emissions represent an urgent global challenge; these are contradictory ideas. If fossil fuels are truly on the verge of disappearing, the emissions problem should resolve itself. If, instead, the emissions problem is genuinely urgent, then it must follow that fossil fuels will remain important for far longer than they would care to admit.
The opposite extreme is no better. If fossil fuels are likely to remain central to the global economy for decades, dismissing concerns about emissions becomes increasingly irresponsible. The persistence of fossil fuels is not an argument against mitigation; it is one of the strongest arguments for it.
If policymakers, investors, and the public believe fossil fuels are about to disappear, there is no incentive to invest in technologies that reduce their environmental impact. Why spend resources reducing emissions from an industry that is entering terminal decline?
That logic immediately collapses if the forecasts are wrong. If fossil fuels will remain a major part of the global energy system for decades, as others predict, then carbon capture, methane reduction, efficiency improvements, cleaner industrial processes, and other mitigation strategies become more important, not less important.
Fossil fuels will continue lifting people out of poverty and supporting economic development across much of the world for a long time to come. Ignoring that reality does not make it disappear, and ignoring the environmental consequences of that reality could prove dangerous, long term.
Unfortunately, public discussion often discourages realism. If you dare to point out that fossil fuels remain essential, environmentalists will accuse you of opposing progress; this has happened to me many times. If you dare to mention the environmental risks, others will dismiss you as hostile to economic development; this has also happened to me. The result is a debate dominated by competing absolutes, while practical solutions receive far less attention than they deserve.
Fossil fuels are likely to remain a major part of the global energy system for decades, even centuries. They also create environmental challenges that deserve serious attention. Both statements can be true at the same time; in fact, they are true.
Poor forecasts do more than produce bad headlines. They encourage governments, investors, and citizens to prepare for a future that may never arrive. Good policy begins with accurate assumptions. The challenge is not choosing between economic development and environmental responsibility. The challenge is accepting that fossil fuels will remain part of the global energy system and then developing practical ways to reduce the costs and consequences of that reality.
Source Links & Notes:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-end-of-cheap-oil/
https://rmi.org/app/uploads/2017/06/RMI_Winning_the_Oil_Endgame_Book_2005.pdf
https://www.businessinsider.com/kurzweil-says-free-solar-energy-20-years-2014-9
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-ev-oil-crisis/
I did not include the next source in the main article, but readers interested in the evolution of these forecasts may find it useful. It provides a clear and recent example of changing expectations regarding peak oil demand and future fossil fuel growth.
The other sources cited in this article are representative examples intended to illustrate broader themes in energy forecasting over the past several decades. In a few cases, I have taken modest liberties in summarizing or grouping related arguments to fit them into the larger narrative discussed here. Readers familiar with the history of these debates will recognize that I am not materially departing from either the substance of the forecasts or the public discussions surrounding them at the time.
A comprehensive treatment of every forecast, caveat, and competing viewpoint would require a much longer article. My goal here is not to litigate every historical prediction, but rather to highlight recurring patterns that have shaped energy discussions for decades. I have made a good-faith effort to present those patterns fairly and without unnecessary exaggeration.
If you believe I have materially mischaracterized a source or forecast, I welcome the discussion. However, I suspect most disagreements will concern interpretation and emphasis rather than the broader historical trends described above, which I believe are well established or I would not mention them.
Tags: Fossil Fuels, Energy Transition, Energy Forecasting, Carbon Capture, Energy Demand, Economic Development, Climate Policy